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STEVEN J. SHUPE,* GARY D. WEATHERFORD,** and
ELIZABETH CHECCHIO***

Western Water Rights: The Era of
Reallocation
ABSTRACT
As new supplies of water resources become increasingly scarce

in the arid West, existing water rights are being reallocatedto meet
new demands. Water is at times reallocated involuntarily, such as
throughforfeiture or adverse possession, although voluntary market
mechanisms are more common forms of reallocation. Water marketing takes many shapes, including temporary leasing of water,

purchase of permanent rights, dry year options, water banking, and
many other innovative arrangements. As the volume of water marketing grows in the West, so too do the associated controversies.
Questions involving impacts on rural communities, the off-reservation leasing of Indian water, interstate marketing, sale of federallysupplied water, and many other issues will challenge western officials
during this new era of water reallocation.

INTRODUCTION
The nineteenth century marked the beginning of an era of intense
resource allocation in the western United States. Land, minerals, and
other resources passed into private ownership as Congress enacted laws
to facilitate the open-the-West ethic that prevailed during this period.
Farmlands were homesteaded, mineral claims were patented, and railroad
companies received valuable acreage from the public domain. Water, too,
was allocated to serve private needs, for it was recognized as the key
needed to unlock these riches of the arid West.
State water law, as deferred to by Congress, evolved primarily into the
prior appropriation doctrine which granted a permanent water right to
those who first appropriated surface waters.' This doctrine of "first in
time, first in right" shaped a pattern of resource allocation during this
era which led to the current situation in which water supplies in many
*Steven J. Shupe, President of Shupe & Associates, Inc., combines a law and engineering
background as a water policy consultant based in Santa Fe, New Mexico.
**Gary D. Weatherford is Special Counsel with the San Francisco law firm Payne, Thompson,
Walker & Taaffe.
***Elizabeth Checchio is a hydrologist and water policy consultant based in Tucson, Arizona.
I. See, e.g., Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882); Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140
(1855).
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areas throughout the arid western states are fully appropriated. The demand for additional water, however, has not stopped.
Expanding municipalities, industrial development, and other economic
activities compete for limited supplies in regions where there is simply
no additional water available to tap. Increasingly, users who need new
sources are looking to existing water rights as a means for augmenting
their supplies. In particular, senior irrigation rights (which account for
more than 80 percent of total water consumption in the West) are being
purchased in order to satisfy new demands in many western areas. In
short, we are entering an era of water "reallocation" in the West that is
just as significant as the allocation era of the previous century, and which
presents as many difficult questions.
This article takes a close look at this new era, beginning with a summary
of the mechanisms through which water rights are currently reallocated
under western state law. A practical discussion of water right purchases
follows, including descriptions of the prices and characteristics of current
market transactions. The article concludes with an analysis of the legal
and institutional issues that are emerging to challenge those who make
policies in the era of water reallocation.
WATER REALLOCATION MECHANISMS
Although the marketing and transfer of water rights is receiving increased attention, the concept of reallocating water rights is not new to
the West. One of the most famous examples was the undercover purchase
of tens of thousands of acres of agricultural land and its associated water
rights in the Owens River Valley by agents of Los Angeles shortly after
the turn of the century.' In addition, common law evolved under the prior
appropriation doctrine that provided for the reallocation of water under
certain conditions. State legislatures stepped into the picture and refined
legal doctrines (for example, forfeiture) that effected water rights transfers. Today reallocation of water in the West can be accomplished either
by adverse action taken against a water user's right, or by voluntary
arrangements between old and new water users.
Involuntary Loss of Water Rights
Water rights occasionally are transferred against the will of the water
rights holder. Involuntary loss of water rights is effected both through
common law and through statutory provisions.

2. W.

KAHRL, WATER AND POWER

(1982).
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Forfeiture and Abandonment
All or part of a water right can be forfeited under the laws of most
western states. The benefit of such forfeiture inures to junior water users,
new appropriators, or the public. State statutes specify a time period,
typically three to five years of continuous non-beneficial use, that results
in prima facie forfeiture of a water right? Forfeiture statutes can be
invoked when water rights have fallen into complete disuse, or when
water is over-applied and not used beneficially for the statutory time
period.
Abandonment is the common law relative of forfeiture which serves
to extinguish unused water rights. In the case of abandonment, however,
there is no prescribed period of nonuse, and the intent to abandon the
water right by its holder must be shown. Local competitive pressures for
limited water supplies can trigger forfeiture and abandonment claims,
although they have not been invoked frequently. Such claims may become
more common in stream adjudications and regulatory proceedings as water
shortages become increasingly acute. The moving parties in such actions
are often junior water users attempting to reallocate dormant senior water
rights to themselves. Senior rights may also be involuntarily reallocated
through adverse possession, wherein land and water are adversely used
for a statutory period, resulting in the loss of the property by the original
owner to the interloper.
Eminent Domain
Public agencies and utilities are frequently authorized under state law
to condemn existing water rights. Such takings, though unpopular, have
preceded the construction of several large water projects. For example,
the rights of riparian owners to flood flows of the San Joaquin River in
California were condemned and ruled compensable in the construction
of the' Friant Dam in the Central Valley Project. Condemnation is also
an option for cities that find it difficult to identify new water sources to
meet growing water demands. Municipal water condemnation authority
can be found in many western state constitutions and statutes that create
a hierarchy of beneficial uses or that allow a "higher and better" use to
prevail .' Just compensation must accompany any condemnation of vested
water rights in order for the reallocation of water by taking to be constitutional.
3. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §45-141(C) (1988); IDAHO CODE §42-222(2) (1987); OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 540,610 (1988); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-401 (1977).
4. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE 90.03.040 (1989).
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The Public Trust Doctrine
Owners of vested water rights historically have felt secure in their
continuing ability to utilize the rights for their needs. The threat of condemnation was small, and if invoked would result in payment for the
water rights. The security of senior water rights holders has been shaken,
however, by the recent extension of the public trust doctrine to inland
waters. 5
In 1983 the California Supreme Court ruled that Los Angeles' rights
to take water from streams feeding Mono Lake, acquired decades earlier
under state law, are subordinated to the public interest in preserving Mono
Lake. 6 The state, as trustee for its citizens, is not entitled to issue water
use permits to Los Angeles if such permits would undermine the public
interest in Mono Lake. The Supreme Court remanded the case for determination of the extent to which the existing diversion rights of Los
Angeles may need to be curtailed in order to reallocate the water to the
in situ public needs at Mono Lake.
Although the legal issues are far from settled, other western state courts
have also recently looked with favor on the public trust doctrine for
protection of inland water resources. In interpreting Idaho law, the Director of Water Resources stated in 1987 that water rights granted under
state law "remain subject to the public trust. This duty is a continuing
duty, which may take precedence over vested water rights." 7 Depending
on how the law evolves, the public trust doctrine holds the potential to
become a powerful force in the reallocation of western water rights from
senior uses to instream flows and other purposes that serve the public.
Voluntary Transfers
Although several legal mechanisms exist for mandating reallocation of
water rights, a majority of water transfers involve voluntary agreements
between willing parties. A variety of strategies that are advantageous to
each party can be used to effect water right transfers.
Sale of Total Entitlement
In many instances, water rights holders are free to sell their entire
entitlements to one or more purchasers. Procedures for and restrictions
on the outright sale of senior water rights depend on the nature of the
5. For a discussion of the public trust doctrine, see Dunning, The Public Trust Doctrine and
Western Water Law: Discord or Harmony, 30 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 17 (1984).
6. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346,
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983)..
7. In the Matter of Application for Permit to Appropriate Water No. 36-7200 (Idaho Dept. of
Water Resources, July 22, 1987) (Memorandum Decision and Order of the Director).
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rights and the jurisdiction in which they are located. A private water right
can be embodied in a filing or decree in the courthouse, a license or
permit issued by a state agency, a share of mutual water company or
district stock, a pattern of historical use without written record, ownership
of riparian land, or a water delivery contract with a local, state, tribal,
or federal water agency.
The transfer of each of these types of rights has specific characteristics.
With a riparian or a recorded appropriative right, for example, the total
interest in that water right is transferred by implied or express reference
in the delivery of the deed to the appurtenant land. Water right shares in
a mutual company, or contract rights in a project, are often simply assigned from one party to another to complete a transfer. State-issued
licenses and permits may likewise be assigned, although typically only
with governmental review and approval.
Although the formalities differ among jurisdictions, the prevailing rule
in the West is that most appropriative water fights may, with state agency
or court approval, be sold and transferred to different land.' Such transfers
may include changes in type and location of use and in the point of
diversion, so long as the change does not adversely affect other water
right holders on the stream. Exceptions to this rule exist, but even with
constraints to water marketing in some states, the permanent sale and
transfer of water rights occurs widely throughout the West.
Leases for a Fixed Term
The transfer of the right to use water need not be permanent. A water
right in most jurisdictions may be leased for a season, a year, or many
years. This can be an attractive option for both parties because it maintains
continuity, preserves ownership by the holder of the right for future use,
and accommodates an intermediate use that has either a predictable life
span (as in the case of a power plant with a 30-year amortization period)
or an uncertain duration (as in a farming enterprise facing variable commodity prices).
Parties to a water lease are able to customize the arrangement to accommodate their specific needs. To increase flexibility, the lease can
contain an option for renewal. Also, to reduce future uncertainties, the
rental rate can be indexed over time to reflect inflation or deflation of the
economy. Many fixed term leasing arrangements exist among western
water users.
The city of Albuquerque is active in pursuing leases of its surplus
B. See, e.g., Gould, Conversion ofAgricultural Water Rights to Industrial Use, 27B ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. 1791, 1820 (1982).
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waters. In early 1987, the city council authorized the expenditure of
$100,000 to promote its leasing program of San Juan-Chama water imported into the Rio Grande from the Colorado River basin. 9 The San
Juan-Chama project was completed in 1971, and Albuquerque is paying
the Bureau of Reclamation more than one million dollars annually for
delivery of 48,200 acre-feet/year (ac-ftlyr). Because the city does not yet
need the water, it has leased a portion of its surplus, including 1, 100 acft/yr to vineyard owners in southern New Mexico. Albuquerque annually
charges $40/ac-ft, a price roughly equal to the amount it pays per acrefoot to the Bureau of Reclamation.'o
Many short term leasing arrangements occur in other areas of the West.
In Idaho, seasonal leasing arrangements have been formalized into the
Upper Snake Water Bank. Holders of surplus surface water entitlements
from the Bureau of Reclamation may place those entitlements into the
bank for lease to water users who want additional supplies. The local
board of control sets the price at $2.50/ac-ft, the amount the lessor owes
the Bureau for the water. The major lessee of the water entitlements
typically is Idaho Power Company, which leaves the water instream for
hydropower generation. Each acre-foot of water in the stream generates
from $11 to $23 worth of electricity for Idaho Power Company."
Seasonal leasing of water in Idaho, as elsewhere in the arid West, can
also be triggered by drought. In 1987, with snowpack averaging only
about 50 percent of normal, Idaho farmers began leasing water from
neighbors with groundwater supplies. Following an announcement by the
Boise Project Board of Control that farmers would get less than half their
normal 3 ac-ft/acre of surface water delivery, prices for leased groundwater jumped from $20/ac-ft to as much as $60/ac-ft. Major lessees
included farmers with late-season irrigation needs who had already planted
their potatoes, sugar beets, seed corn, and hops at costs of up to $3,000/
acre.12
During droughts, water users do not necessarily have to scramble to
9. 1 WATER MARKET UPDATE, Mar. 1987, at 8. The WATER MARKET UPDATE is a newsletter that
tracks the latest developments in the legal, social, and business aspects of water reallocation and
marketing the western United States. It is published monthly by Shupe & Associates, Inc., Steven
J. Shupe, editor.
10. 1 WATER MARKET UPDATE. Feb. 1987, at I.
I I. I WATER MARKET UPDATE, Jan. 1987. at 3. The year 1988 was an exception, when Idaho
Power Company was able to buy only 50,000 acre-feet. Local irrigators purchased the majority of
water from the bank in response to drought conditions.
12, I WATER MARKET UPDATE, May 1987, at 1. Summer rains in 1987, however, eased the
shortage, resulting in fewer water transfers than were anticipated. During the drought of 1988. the
Boise Project Board of Control established a local water bank similar to the Upper Snake Water
Bank. The price for leasing water from the Boise Bank in 1988 was set at $5.50/acre-foot, a price
exceeding that paid by Boise Project contractors to the United States, but still significantly less than
the market value of water in the area.

Spring 19891

WESTERN WATER RIGHTS

find emergency water supplies. Increasingly, users that need reliable supplies are assessing the purchase of dry-year options.

The Dry-Year Option
When water users normally have a reliable supply but are subject to
unacceptable shortfalls in dry years, they can acquire an option to lease
water from another party during those dry years. Dry-year options have
been negotiated between some cities and farmers in the West. For example, a Utah city paid $25,000 for the option to lease a senior irrigation
water right, and agreed to supply the farmer with 300 tons of hay and
$1,000 in any season that it exercised its option. 3 For the first twentyfive years that the arrangement was in effect, the city used the water a
total of three dry seasons. In those seasons the farmer had hay without
harvesting, a cash payment, and some pasture production from nonirrigated farming.
In 1987, the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD)
initiated negotiations on a dry-year option with farmers in the Palo Verde
Irrigation District for the right to use up to 100,000 ac-ft of their water
during future dry years. MWD offered the irrigators $200 for each acre
they place in the option program and a minimum of an additional $400/
acre each year that MWD exercises its option and diverts the water
(estimated to be 4.6 ac-ft/acre) to southern California municipalities. 4 If
agreed upon, the arrangement would last 35 years, with the irrigators
continuing to farm except during those years in which MWD exercises
its option."
In northern California, the East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD) is assessing a dry-year option as one strategy to augment municipal
water supplies. In July, 1988, EBMUD offered to enter into a long term
arrangement with local irrigators for a dry-year option. In those years
deemed "critically dry" by the state's index, EBMUD would purchase
the irrigators' water for about $50/ac-ft. The proposal proved controversial
and was rejected by area water users who consider the price too low.
Despite this setback, EBMUD is still exploring a dry-year option as one
way to meet future water supply needs. 6
13. Clyde, Legal and InstitutionalAspects of Drought Management, in DROUGHT MANAGEMENT
AND ITS IMPAcT ON PUBLIC WATER SYSTEMS (1986).

14. 1 WATER MARKET UPDATE, June 1987, at 8.
15. Irrigators rejected this proposal due to the uncertainty it would have introduced into their
long range farm planning. PVID currently is considering an alternative proposal made by MWD
which involves a lease program. See 2 WATER MARKET UPDATE, Feb. 1988, at 2.
16. 2 WATER MARKET UPDATE, Sept. 1988, at 13.
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Subordination Agreements
Subordination agreements achieve a purpose similar to that of dry-year
option arrangements. They are based on the fact that a major attribute of
an appropriative water right is its relative priority, which can be marketed
separately from the right itself. For example, a subordination agreement
could be useful for a city with a junior water right (for example, the
fourth priority on a stream system) that needs to build a new water
treatment plant but cannot obtain financing because its water right is not
judged reliable enough. If the city could purchase "consent-not-to-sue"
agreements from the holders of the three senior priorities, under which
those holders would allow their rights to become subordinate in dry years,
a more reliable water right could be created without any formal transfer.
A senior priority may be compromised for something other than money.
It can be given up for storage rights or other benefits in a new water
project. For example, the Navajo Indian Nation, which has a senior
priority claim on the San Juan River, agreed in 1968 to share shortages
during droughts in order to obtain federal authorization for the Navajo
Indian Irrigation Project. This allowed construction of the San JuanChama Project, which delivers transbasin water into the Rio Grande
drainage basin to serve central New Mexico. 7
Conservation Offsets
Another reallocation strategy for junior municipal and industrial users
that need a more reliable supply is to make water conservation investments
in a senior use. By financing the modernization of old irrigation systems,
junior users may be able to make surplus water available for their use,
while letting the senior user continue to irrigate the same amount of land
with less water. Although the legal questions involving such an arrangement are complex, this strategy is being pursued in a number of areas
around the West.
The city of Casper, Wyoming, applied this conservation strategy in the
early 1980s in conjunction with the Alcova Irrigation District. The city
financed canal lining and other means of reducing irrigation losses in the
district, then diverted the salvaged water for municipal use. Casper, which
receives an annual right to divert several thousand ac-ft under this arrangement, concluded that financing conservation measures was the most
cost-effective way to increase its water supply.
Conservation strategies are also being pursued in southern California
to firm up municipal water supplies. In October 1988, the Bureau of
17. Price & Weatherford, Indian Water Rights in Theory and Practice, 40 LAW & CONTEMP.
128 (1976).

PROB.
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Reclamation awarded a $5.2 million contract to line 1.5 miles of the
Coachella Canal. The project will test an in-place lining technique that
may eventually be used to seal large portions of the Coachella and AllAmerican canals. Annual water savings of the ultimate lining project are
expected to total 100,000 ac-ft/yr. The MWD is a major proponent of
the project and plans to pay a large part of the bill in return for diverting
salvaged water." South of Coachella, the Imperial Irrigation District (liD)
is also engaged in water conservation planning that may save 300,000 to
500,000 acre-feet a year through canal lining, tail-water recovery, and
other improvements. lID has negotiated with MWD for the financing of
these improvements, with the parties having reached a tentative agreement
in late 1988. Under the agreement, MWD will divert 100,000 ac-ft/yr of
conserved water for 35 years at an annual cost of about $128/ac-ft.' 9
Exchanges
An agreement to exchange one water supply for another temporarily,
seasonally, or permanently can prove advantageous to parties with water
rights that for some reason are not appropriate to their respective needs.
For example, exchanges can be motivated by water quality differences
when a municipality exchanges its surface diversions for an irrigator's
higher quality groundwater. More commonly, however, water exchanges
are arranged in order to accommodate delivery of water to the place of
need. Examples of such exchange arrangements abound in the western
states.
In May 1987, the town of Alta, which lies in a canyon above Salt Lake
City, offered to purchase 235 ac-ft of permanent water rights from a
cemetery located in the lower valley. Because it would be prohibitively
expensive to pump this water up to Alta, the town negotiated with Salt
Lake City to exchange its newly purchased rights for water rights that
Salt Lake City owns in Alta Canyon. The city could make direct use of
the cemetery rights, and Alta could utilize the Alta Canyon rights without
the cost of pumping. 2'
Water exchange arrangements are common in the Colorado Front Range,
where transmountain tunnels and ditches provide flexibility in delivering
water between the Colorado, South Platte, and Arkansas river basins. In
a 1987 transaction, the city of Aurora in the South Platte basin purchased
several hundred acre-feet of permanent water rights from irrigators in the
18. 2 WATER MARKET UPDATE, Oct. 1988, at 10.
19. 1 WATER MARKET UPDATE, Dec. 1987, at 2; 2 id. at 4 (Oct. 1988); id. at 4 (Dec. 1988).
20. 1 WATER MARKET UPDATE, June 1987, at 1. This deal did not close, however, due to
disagreements over contract provisions.
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Arkansas basin. 2 Through a complex paper exchange of water to upstream
reservoirs and across the drainage divide, Aurora will be able to utilize
this water for future municipal needs. A similar need for an exchange
faces the city of Mesa, Arizona, which in 1985 purchased 12,000 acres
of land in southern Arizona to obtain the associated groundwater rights.
The city plans to pump this water for delivery to Tucson in exchange for
water entitlements that Tucson would otherwise receive from the Central
Arizona Project.
RECENT MARKET TRANSACTIONS
Of the several ways in which water reallocation is taking place in the
West, the most common is the outright purchase of water rights. Recent
examples of permanent water right purchases reflect various prices and
different means through which the sales are accomplished."
Water Ranches
As western water law developed, water rights were generally considered to be appurtenant to the land to which they were originally applied.
Some jurisdictions, therefore, require new users to purchase the land
associated with the water right in order to effect a water transfer to a new
place of use. Also, irrigators are often reluctant to sell water rights independent of the land, because land without water is of little economic
value in many parts of the west. These factors have led to the purchase
of "water ranches"-lands conveyed solely for their associated water
rights.
Arizona has developed the most active market in water ranches as its
growing municipalities compete for new supplies. Although most Arizona
cities currently have sufficient water, the 1980 Arizona Groundwater Management Act 3 mandates that municipalities and developers must show a
100-year water supply for new growth. As a result, water purveyors in
the Phoenix and Tucson areas have been reaching out to buy irrigated
farmland to provide a long term water supply for anticipated growth.24
The city of Scottsdale began its acquisition program in 1984 by purchasing several thousand agricultural acres with water rights from the
Bill Williams River in western Arizona for $11.6 million. The ultimate
21. I WATER MARKET UPDATE, Sept. 1987, at 1.
22. The examples of water market transactions described in Section II are all taken from WATER
MARKET UPDATE, Vol. I (1987) and Vol.2 (1988).
23. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-401 to 45-655 (1988). For a description of the Act, see Ferris,
Arizona's Groundwater Code: Strength in Compromise, 78 AM. WATER WORKS Ass'N J. 79 (Oct.
1986).
24. Arizona's groundwater also is of interest to private investors who have purchased more than
30,000 acres in western Arizona for the associated groundwater.
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cost of this project may far exceed that of buying the land and water,
since delivery may require construction of a 150-mile pipeline. The city
of Tucson also began early purchases of water ranches, buying thousands
of acres in the fertile Avra Valley west of the city. In 1986, it purchased
an additional 1,350 acres (with associated pumping rights of about 4,000
ac-ft/yr) at costs averaging from $600 to $780/ac-ft of annual water
entitlement. Phoenix joined the purchase trend in December 1986 when
its city council approved a $32 million purchase of agricultural lands in
La Paz county. Phoenix plans to pump 30,000 ac-ft/yr from the region
and hopes to use the Central Arizona Project canal to bring the water to
municipal users. In the meantime, it has leased much of the land to the
Colorado River Indian Tribes for agricultural production.
In Colorado, the city of Thornton (north of Denver) announced in 1986
that it had made arrangements to purchase 12,000 acres of irrigated
farmland for $52 million in order to obtain the associated water rights.
Thornton had retained private brokers to purchase the land and water
secretly in order to prevent prices from rising. By early 1987 the city
had finalized 90 real estate closings, and is currently assessing how to
transport the water to the city at the least cost and with minimal effect
on the agricultural community.
A water ranch was purchased in 1987 in New Mexico by the town of
Roswell. The town paid $1.88 million for the 580-acre ranch, which
carries a right to pump 1,740 ac-ft/yr for agricultural use. The town
expects to be able to convert 70 percent of the right to municipal purposes.
Because Roswell does not need the water immediately, it leased the land
and water to a local farmer for three years at nearly $49,000/year.
Blocks of Water District Shares
When a municipality or other user needs to purchase water rights, it
is not always necessary to buy the appurtenant land. Major transactions
in water rights in several areas have involved buying shares of agricultural
water district stock independent of the land. This practice has been occurring for twenty-five years in northeastern Colorado, where an active
market exists for Colorado-Big Thompson (CBT) shares.
The CBT project began importing water from the Colorado River basin
into the South Platte basin around 1960, primarily to provide supplemental
irrigation water to area farmers. Local cities in this region, however,
experienced rapid expansion and began buying shares, as did farmers
who wanted to increase their irrigated acreage. Although prices for CBT
water remained under $100/ac-ft during the initial years of trading, by
the late 1970s the purchase price had risen to about $3,000/ac-ft. Then,
in 1981, prices plummeted after the local cities committed themselves to
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financing the Windy Gap Project to import additional Colorado River
water for municipal use. Purchases of CBT units still occur today, but at
prices averaging slightly more than $1,000/ac-ft.
Many other water district shares are being purchased in Colorado,
primarily by municipalities. In December 1986, the Fort Collins City
Council authorized the purchase of 100 shares in the North Poudre Irrigation Company at $3,250/share, or about $1,000/ac-ft of consumable
water. The city is leasing back most of the water to the farmers at nominal
cost for a period of eleven years. The city of Aurora also has made a
number of recent water stock purchases, primarily from the Arkansas
River basin in the southeastern part of the state. For example, in a 1986
agreement involving 90 shareholders, Aurora paid $2,500/ac-ft for water
shares in the Colorado Canal Company that yield 5,600 ac-ft/yr of consumable water. In response to these transactions, brokers talked to local
irrigators and in 1987 began offering 64 percent of the shares in the Fort
Lyon Canal Company for sale. These shares represent 92,000 ac-ft of
annual historic consumptive use at an asking price of $2,500/ac-ft.25
Utah also has a history of water district share purchases. In the early
1980s, the Intermountain Power Project in southern Utah purchased shares
worth about $70 million in local irrigation districts for water needed at
its new power plant. Purchase price for the water was about $1,750/acft, with the sellers responsible for obtaining approval of the change of
use and arranging for protection of third-party rights. More recently the
Central Utah Water Conservancy District, which delivers water to Salt
Lake City, has been negotiating with local irrigation companies for the
purchase of up to 125,000 ac-ft of permanent water rights. In May 1987,
the District published an offer of $164/ac-ft of permanent water rights,
which elicited responses totaling about 200,000 ac-ft of rights for sale.
By August 1988, the District had purchased 85,000 ac-ft of rights at the
$164/ac-ft price.
Standing Purchase Offers
Instead of going out to buy blocks of irrigation district shares, several
western municipalities and other major water purveyors maintain standing
offers to buy existing water rights. The city of Albuquerque, New Mexico,
has acquired a number of water rights through its standing offer to purchase senior irrigation rights for about $ 1 ,000/ac-ft of historic consumptive use. Although the city has more than adequate water supplies for the
next several decades, it is planning for its future needs by slowly acquiring
rights under this standing offer. Farmers who sell their water rights to
25. As of December 1988, these rights were still listed for sale at the $2,500/acre-foot.
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Albuquerque under this program are automatically allowed to lease them
back for a nominal fee for ten years.
The Las Vegas Valley Water District holds out a $1,000/ac-ft standing
offer to buy groundwater rights in southern Nevada. It uses groundwater
to meet peak demands during the summer, supplementing its main supply
of Colorado River water stored in Lake Mead. Further north, in Reno,
the local water utility holds out a standing offer of $2,000/ac-ft for senior
rights from the Truckee River. Since initiating this offer in 1987, the
utility has purchased nearly 2,000 ac-ft primarily in numerous small
transactions.
In another region of the West, a standing offer price has decreased
dramatically. In the early 1980s, when a recreational land boom was
occurring in Summit County east of Salt Lake City, the Weaver Irrigation
District held out a standing offer of about $500/ac-ft for water rights in
a local canal company. Currently, with the growth rate decreasing, the
District's standing offer is less than half this amount.
Individual Sales
Many water rights transactions simply involve single sales between
buyers and sellers, independent of standing offers, land purchases, or
district shares. Private developers typically use this type of transaction
for their subdivisions and commercial developments. The developer will
purchase a senior irrigation right, retire it, and dedicate the water to the
domestic use associated with the development. In resort areas with limited
water supplies, the cost of individual water rights can be quite high. In
the Park City area in the mountains above Salt Lake, purchase prices
have exceeded $4,000/ac-ft. Water rights in the mountain resort areas of
Colorado have been purchased for nearly $10,000/ac-ft in some instances.
Individual water purchases by developers are often stimulated by local
ordinances that require developers to dedicate water to the town or county
in which the subdivision is to be located. In Las Lunas, New Mexico,
developers must permanently dedicate 2.1 ac-ft of water for each acre
within the subdivision, or pay $2,400 per acre as modified by an inflation
adjustment factor. A similar ordinance in Greeley, Colorado, requires a
3 ac-ft/acre dedication or an in lieu payment of about $1,000/ac-ft. In
the Reno-Sparks area of Nevada, dedication requirements have resulted
in a lively market in small water rights transactions priced in the $1,800
to $2,500/ac-ft range. Water right prices are lower in Brownsville, Texas,
where developers must contribute 1.5 ac-ft/acre of development or make
an in lieu payment of $720/acre.
Even though the agricultural economy is suffering in general, some
farmers are also making individual water right purchases to improve their
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irrigation capacity. Permanent water rights for irrigated orchards have
sold in the Pecos River basin of New Mexico at prices of $1,100 to
$1,200/ac-ft. In Idaho, an irrigator along the Snake River purchased a
2,000 ac-ft water right for $250/ac-ft in September 1988.
Investments Per Se
Not all water purchases are made to fulfill the needs of cities, developers, irrigators, and other end users. Many individuals and corporations
have bought water rights simply because they believe the value of water
rights will escalate. A typical investment transaction involves the purchase
of irrigation water rights and a leasing back of the rights to the farmer
for continued irrigation until the investor is ready to resell the rights. The
lease-back provision can be critical, not only in order to create annual
benefits from the water during the holding period, but also to continue
the beneficial use of surface rights to protect them from forfeiture.
Past investments in water rights have typically involved individual
investors purchasing a particular water right or district share. In recent
years, however, major water right purchases have been made by investors
pooling their money in collective transactions. For instance, private investors paid $7.8 million for an Arizona water ranch and are hoping to resell
the associated 6,200 ac-ft groundwater rights for a profit. In Colorado,
this concept was taken a step further by Western Water Rights Management, Inc., a corporation that raised $35 million in 1985 to purchase
Colorado water rights on behalf of a small group of investors. The corporation has spent more than $10 million on senior irrigation rights that
it believes Colorado cities and industries will buy in the future. The
investment period for this package is 14 years, at which time the investors
hope to realize a significant profit on the resale of the water rights.
Groundwater Markets
The majority of western water transfers involve surface waters. However, groundwater has been purchased with many water ranches, as well
as in areas where groundwater rights are separately transferable. One such
market has existed for many years in the Los Angeles area. Beginning
in the 1960s, a local court established groundwater basins in the Los
Angeles region and assigned pumping rights to individual groundwater
users. Holders of the rights are free to lease groundwater each season or
to sell their rights permanently. In order to facilitate transfers, the court
established a state-sponsored clearinghouse for the annual leasing of pumping
rights. The rights are leased at a set price that reflects operating costs,
local water assessments, and the cost of imported water. In 1988, the
state pool price for leasing an acre-foot of groundwater in the Central
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Basin was $125, up $7 from the 1987 price. Several thousand ac-ft of
groundwater are leased each year in the Los Angeles area.
The Phoenix and Tucson areas also have relatively active markets in
groundwater rights. The 1980 Arizona Groundwater Management Act
established Type 11 groundwater rights' as part of a strategy to control
declining groundwater levels. Type II rights were quantified based upon
the amount of pre-1980 groundwater withdrawals for non-irrigation purposes. The act made Type 11 rights readily transferable with only slight
geographic and other legal restrictions. These rights have been purchased
by new users as well as by speculators who believe their price will rise.
In recent years, such rights have generally sold in the $700 to $1,300/
ac-ft range for permanent use.
In Colorado, landowners have the right to mine and market ancient
groundwater deposits that lie beneath their land and are not hydrologically
connected to surface streams. Particularly in the Denver and Colorado
Springs areas, this nontributary groundwater is an important component
in current water supplies. Offers to sell this groundwater have recently
been published through the Water Exchange Information Service, a multiple listing of water rights for sale in Colorado. Prices for nontributary
groundwater rights are currently listed at $1,000/ac-ft and more.
Marketing of groundwater rights also occurs in other regions of the
West. Sierra Pacific Power Company signed an agreement in 1987 for
the purchase of 2,100 ac-ft of groundwater rights in northwestern Nevada
for $1,150/ac-ft. The Company plans to import the groundwater to its
Reno-Sparks service area if legal objections can be overcome. In early
1987 an Albuquerque private school advertised for sale 102 ac-ft of its
consumable groundwater rights. The school received $1,200/ac-ft for 97
ac-ft and $1,100/ac-ft for the remainder. The city of Albuquerque submitted a bid for the entire amount at its standing offer price of $1,000/
ac-ft, but was overbid by local developers and homeowners.
Groundwater marketing occurs as far east as Kansas, where the town
of Holcomb recently acquired 200 ac-ft of vested groundwater rights from
a local land developer in exchange for water and sewer service (a $500,000
project) and $30,000 cash. Holcomb found this arrangement advantageous
because of uncertainties in obtaining groundwater in southwestern Kansas
where strict anti-depletion policies are being enforced by the state.
MAJOR ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES
The increase in water marketing has introduced new issues and complexities to western water users and government officials. State legislators
26. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §45-464 (1988).
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must decide whether to take a passive role in allowing water markets to
operate under existing structures, or to enact new laws either promoting
or inhibiting water rights transfers. Rural water users must weigh the
desirability of selling water rights and the tradeoffs between a quick cash
influx versus long-term viability of the regional economy. Indian tribes,
federal agencies, and other groups interested in western water also must
assess water marketing and its potential positive and negative effects.
Chief among the legal and institutional issues of water marketing in
the West is the effect of water right transfers on rural areas that historically
have depended upon irrigated agriculture.
Effects On Rural Areas
Agricultural water rights in many areas of the West are being converted
to municipal and other new uses. Large transfers of rights from rural to
urban areas typically cause controversy in the area where the water rights
originate. For example, residents of rural counties are concerned over
erosion of the local tax base when significant amounts of productive land
are taken out of irrigation or purchased for their water rights. The issue
of rural tax base erosion has been particularly important in Arizona as
municipalities have purchased tens of thousands of agricultural acres for
their water rights. Under the Arizona constitution, municipalities cannot
be charged property taxes on land they own. Consequently, water ranches
can severely undermine county tax revenues in areas where cities have
purchased a significant percentage of the private land. In 1986, the Arizona legislature addressed this problem by enacting a statute that empowered municipalities to make voluntary payments to counties in lieu
of property taxes 7 Although some cities have started making in lieu
payments, many rural county officials want additional security. However,
proposed bills to create mandatory payments by cities in lieu of property
taxes failed to pass the Arizona legislature in 1987 and 1988.2
Water right transfers threaten not only county tax bases, but also the
overall economic health of rural areas. When productive agricultural
acreage in an area is suddenly reduced, severe secondary economic impacts can debilitate the remaining farmers, as well as affect the businesses
that supply and depend upon agricultural customers. State legislatures
have been looking at ways of addressing the economic problems associated with water transfers from a region. For example, in the 1987
27. Id. at §45-289.
28. See, e.g., H. R. 2153, 1987 Ariz. Leg. Sess. A 1987 bill which did pass the Arizona legislature
allows for municipally-held lands to be included in a county's net assessed valuation for the purpose
of distributing state-shared sales taxes to counties. This legislation also permits municipal holdings
to be counted in assessed valuation for determining county levy limits, but only if the municipality
formally agrees to make payments in lieu of taxes to the county,
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Colorado legislative session, rural representatives attempted unsuccessfully to require that purchasers of water rights pay the county of origin
five times the amount of property tax revenue lost as a result of transferring
irrigation water rights to other regions. 29 Also, irrigation and conservancy
districts often adopt bylaws to prevent the transfer of water shares outside
the boundaries of their districts in order to protect the local economy.
Economics is only one concern in rural communities over the export
of water rights. The overall quality and character of life can be undermined
in areas where historic irrigation suddenly is terminated. Rural communities and state legislatures are beginning to consider measures to require
revegetation of irrigated agricultural land prior to the transfer of water
rights. More commonly, individuals and rural groups are taking stands
to protect the agricultural lifestyle that is threatened by wholesale removal
of water rights. Such an effort recently entered the courtroom in northern
New Mexico, resulting in a district court ruling in favor of rural protection.
In re Application of Howard Sleeper "'involved the sale of 75 ac-ft of
agricultural water rights by Sleeper and another irrigator to the Tierra
Grande Corporation, which proposed a resort development in northern
New Mexico. The New Mexico state engineer approved the transfer of
the rights to resort-related uses, but local irrigators challenged his approval
in district court. Among other claims, the protestants argued that such a
transfer was contrary to the public welfare.
In an opinion issued in early 1985, the district court judge found the
proposed transfer to be inconsistent with public welfare in this rural region
of the state. Although the proposed resort and ski area would bring in
additional jobs, the judge concluded that "[olver the long run, the local
inhabitants lose management level jobs to outsiders and are relegated to
service jobs, such as waiters and maids."'" The judge also differed with
the corporation's position that "greater economic benefits are more desirable than preservation of a cultural identity. 32 According to the judge:
Northern New Mexicans possess a fierce pride over their history,
traditions and culture. This region of New Mexico and its living
culture are recognized at the state and federal levels as possessing
significant cultural value, not measurable in dollars and cents. The
deep-felt and tradition-bound ties of northern New Mexico families
to the land and water are central to the maintenance of that culture. 3
29. H.R. 1257, Colo. Leg., 56th Sess. (1987); see I WATER

MARKET UPDATE, Mar. 1987, at 6.
30. Rio Arriba County Case No. RA 84-53(C), New Mexico First Judicial District, April 16,
1985, rev'd, In re Application of Howard M. Sleeper, P.2d (N.M. Ct. App.) (Westlaw NM-CS
library), cert. denied, P.2d (N.M. 1988).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. I.
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The judge was "persuaded that to transfer water rights, devoted for
more than a century to agricultural purposes, in order to construct a
playground for those who can pay is a poor trade, indeed." 34 He found
that the transfer application was clearly contrary to the public welfare
and should have been denied by the state engineer.35
Trans-Jurisdictional Marketing
In addition to creating local controversy in rural areas, water transfer
proposals can generate conflict among competing states and other jurisdictions. The 1982 United States Supreme Court decision in Sporhase36
established that water is an article of commerce, and states can not unreasonably restrict its interstate transport and sale. As a consequence,
statutes that ban the export of water are unconstitutional, and western
states that had such statutes began assessing alternatives for controlling
water exports.
One popular alternative being considered involves the state taking a
proprietary interest in water rights and entering the regional water market.
This approach could broaden the state's control over who uses water both
in-state and out-of-state, as well as generate revenues for public treasuries.
The Montana legislature applied this approach in a statute enacted in 1985
providing that any new water appropriation in excess of 4,000 ac-ft/year
(or diverted at a rate greater than 5.5 cubic feet per second) must be
leased from the state.37 In the past, such an appropriation would have
created a permanent, vested water right in the private owner rather than
a permit subject to a term of years, an annual fee, and other conditions
imposed by the state.
The New Mexico legislature has initiated a similar approach by approving the use of funds to study the concept of appropriating groundwater
in the name of the state and marketing portions of it.38 This action was
spawned by the attempts of El Paso, Texas, to claim significant quantities
of groundwater underlying southeastern New Mexico.39 After New Mexico's anti-export statute was ruled unconstitutional, the state looked to
the appropriation and conditional lease of groundwater as a strategy to
resist El Paso's bid for water. Similarly, the Nebraska legislature in 1987
34. Id.
35. Id. This decision was later reversed by the New Mexico court of appeals based on the fact
that specific public interest language was not added to the governing statutes until after the application
to transfer was filed.
36. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
37. MoNT. CODE ANN. §85-2-141 (1988).
38. H.B. 337, 38th Leg., 1st Sess., ch. 182, 1987 N.M. Laws 1039.
39. S. SHUPE & J. FOLK-WILLIAMS, THE UPPER Rio GRANDE: A GUIDE To DECISION MAKING (1988).

Spring 19891

WESTERN WATER RIGHTS

approved a bill authorizing the study of state appropriation and purchase
of water.'
These examples of states considering entering the water market to
control their resources occur in situations where no interstate compacts
or decrees govern the allocation of interstate waters. Where agreements
and compacts do allocate interstate waters, states need not assert jurisdiction over the water in order to claim control over its future use.
Nonetheless, difficult interstate marketing issues can arise in basins where
compacts allocate limited water supplies among competing states. The
specific question arises whether users with vested water fights in an
upstream state may sell and transfer their entitlements to users in downstream states.
This question has surfaced in the Colorado River basin as well as other
regions of the West over the past few years. Some water officials argue
that it is unlawful to undertake interstate marketing of water to a state
other than the one that is entitled to use it under compact. Others maintain
that to prevent interstate marketing perpetuates antiquated water use patterns that run contrary to efficient water utilization and modern demands.
Whatever the case, an increasing number of proposals for interstate water
marketing challenge the strict construction of compacts and force decisionmakers to face this difficult issue.
Water leasing by Indian tribes to off-reservation users also raises difficult interjurisdictional issues. The right of tribes to lease land and water
for on-reservation development has long been recognized. Congressional
approval, however, is generally required for the lease of Indian water
outside reservation boundaries to non-Indian users. Although Congress,
in 1982, explicitly sanctioned off-reservation leasing by the Tohono
O'Odham Indian Nation (located west of Tucson),4 growing political
pressure from western water interests has recently made it difficult for
tribes to gain off-reservation leasing approval. Recent Indian water rights
settlement bills were delayed in Congress due to controversy over provisions granting tribes the right to market water off the reservation.42
Transferring Federally-Supplied Water
Another major issue in the future of western water marketing is the
40. Leg. Bill 146, 1987 Neb. Leg., 90th Sess.
41. Southern Arizona Water Rights Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 97-293, 96 Stat. 1261 (1982).
42. Of three Indian water rights settlement bills passed by Congress in October t988, only the
Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community Water Rights Settlement Act of 1988 (H.R. 4102)
retained its original off-reservation water leasing provision. In the cases of the San Luis Rey Indian
Water Settlement Act (S. 795) and the Colorado Ute Indian Water Settlement Act (H.R. 2642, 5&
1415), off-reservation leasing was severely restricted in the bills prior to passage. See 2 WATER
MARKET UPDATE, Nov. 1988, at 8.
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transfer of water supplied by Bureau of Reclamation projects. The 1902
Reclamation Act set in motion the construction of numerous dams in the
West designed primarily to deliver cheap water to irrigators. As water
demands shift to new municipal and industrial uses in many western
areas, the question arises whether federally-supplied irrigation waters can
be transferred to these new demands, and if so, who should receive the
additional income generated.
In early 1986, officials of the U.S. Department of Interior expressed
their intent to promote the transfer of federally-supplied waters.4
Congressional delegates from the western states quickly squelched the
idea pending additional study and consideration. Later that year the Western Governors' Association convened a task force composed of state
officials and Interior representatives to discuss various water transfer and
efficiency issues, including the proper role of the federal government in
such transfers. In July 1987, the western governors adopted a resolution
reflecting the importance of integrating federal water policy into the water
reallocation picture." Actual policy decisions, however, are still being
formulated by the Department of the Interior.
Marketing of Salvaged Water
Water marketing is perceived by many as an effective way to promote
water use efficiency throughout the West. States are examining how efficiency can be promoted by allowing farmers who modernize wasteful
irrigation systems to sell the conserved water.
Current law in western states regarding the marketing of salvaged water
is usually complex and rarely clear. Commentators of previous decades
were confronted with a simpler situation, and were able to state with
some certainty that "the prevailing rule is that the person who installs
water saving devices is allowed to take the water thus saved." 4" Such a
statement was generally made after citing several old cases in which
irrigators who installed pipes and lined ditches were given the right to
utilize the former seepage losses.'
Such a conclusion is not so simple under current standards, practices,
and knowledge. With groundwater now being heavily utilized throughout
the West, ditch seepage and other return flows rarely can be salvaged
without adversely affecting other water users. Moreover, most jurisdic43. The Undersecretary of the Interior announced in a February 1986 speech that a water marketing
policy statement was soon to be issued.
44. Res. 87-015 (1987). Reprinted in I WATER MARKET UPDATE, Aug. 1987, at 11.
45. Dickenson, Installation of Water Saving Devices as a Means of Enlarging an Appropriative
Right to Use of Water, 2 NAT. REs. LAW 272, 285 (1969).
46. Id.
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tions flatly prohibit senior users changing the water right in a way that
would injure junior users in the basin. As a consequence, improvements
in irrigation efficiency that simply reduce return flows usually will not
enable the investor to capture the conserved water if those return flows
had historically been used by others.
Some states further inhibit water salvage by allowing a transfer of
irrigation rights only to the extent of historic crop consumption. Consequently, if there are irretrievable losses (i.e., evaporation, weed transpiration, or irretrievable percolation), the irrigator is not entitled to salvage
and market this portion of the water right.
In order to clarify the law and promote water use efficiency, several
state legislatures have considered bills that explicitly sanction the marketing and use of salvaged irrigation water. In 1985, the California legislature enacted bills which modified rules to authorize and encourage
the transfer of salvaged water.4" A similar bill was introduced in Colorado
that same year, but was defeated by downstream agricultural interests
who feared that the salvage of wasted water upstream would ultimately
affect their water rights.
The most comprehensive water salvage bill was enacted by the Oregon
legislature in 1987.48 The statute explicitly allows irrigators to reduce
their historical losses and market the conserved water to other users. The
statute also establishes the guideline that 25 percent of the salvaged water
should remain in the stream if it is needed to protect fish and other elements
in the public interest.
CONCLUSION
The reallocation of water rights promises to play an important role in
meeting future water demands in the West. Numerous questions about
the future character of water marketing and transfers remain unanswered.
Will states facilitate the marketing of salvaged water to promote improved
efficiency? Will Indian tribes choose to lease large amounts of their water,
and if so, will they be able to persuade Congress to approve such programs? How will rural communities be protected against water transfers
that affect local economies and lifestyles? Will the public trust doctrine
result in a judicial reallocation of historic water appropriations to protect
the public interest in free-flowing waters?
These and other important issues are on the horizon as we enter the
era of water reallocation. Many challenges lie ahead for public officials,
water managers, and others who must make decisions regarding the future
47. CAL. WATER CODE § 1011 (1988).
48. OR. REV. STAT. §§537.455-.500, 540.510(2), (3) (1988).
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use of water in the West. Perhaps we are better prepared to face the
upcoming challenges than were decisionmakers in the nineteenth century
era of resource allocation. Or perhaps we are destined to learn again
through trial and error in an attempt to arrive at an equitable system. It
is a time in which dialogue and cooperation among competing interest
groups are critical. Water reallocation and marketing, for better or worse,
are a part of our future in the West, and we must prepare to face the
challenge.

